I found it helpful to go over the homework in class--sometimes it's hard to distill from the videos or readings exactly what the connections we should make are. Having the opportunity to establish that was really helpful.
My question / concern is that if a child is too young to testify and we don't consider their evaluator a live witness, then how do we prosecute these child molestation cases? What evidence would be sufficient enough?
Professor Nesson, how would your sufficiency theory of the Confrontation Clause handle any child sex abuse case, where the child is the accuser? Would none of them be able to be prosecuted at all without putting a three-year-old child on the stand?
I have been thinking about how maybe, for children under 6, for example, we modify cross in some way--to account for developmental barriers to consistent testimony and recall. But I am not sure how that looks. An advocate with the child? Like we might offer in a slightly different way for adult survivors of sexual abuse? A different kind of court all together like some of the alternatives created for children who are commercially sexually exploited, for example
I am wondering to whether Nesson's interpretation of the confrontation clause sticks to what he views as the textualist and originalist interpretation because he thinks textualism and originalism are the proper modes of interpretation, or just because, in this particular case, he thinks that proper application of textualism and originalism leads to the policy that he likes?
Love Gaia's description that these cases fall "between a rock and a hard place" - in your opinion Prof Nesson, what's the best compromise between your interpretation and Scalia's? Where do we actually go from here?
P3X-888: My question / concern is that if a child is too young to testify and we don't consider their evaluator a live witness, then how do we prosecute these child molestation cases? What evidence would be sufficient enough?